University of Copenhagen steps up defences against espionage

The University of Copenhagen (UCPH) has tightened its procedures to protect critical research from being misused for military or strategic purposes abroad.

From now on, all collaborations, visits, and appointments involving individuals affiliated with China, Russia, or Iran will undergo a security assessment.

This is stated in a message on the university’s intranet KUnet, where the procedures have been released.

The university has already been working for some time on screening individuals from these three countries however, as the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) considers them high-risk states in relation to research espionage.

READ ALSO: Deputy Director: International spying a future threat to research

The procedures are not therefore new, according to Kim Brinckmann, Vice-Director at the University of Copenhagen and head of the Research & Information Security unit. But more an extension of an existing practice that has now been further formalised, systematised, and communicated widely across the university.

The screening of individuals from these three high-risk countries has its origin in national guidelines, so-called URIS guidelines, that were introduced in 2022, following a number of revelations about the misuse of Western research.

»This is a continuation of that. We are still in the process of implementing the guidelines and recommendations introduced with URIS, and this is a step in that process,« Kim Brinckmann says to the University Post.

Cases in recent years have shown that research developed in Denmark or in collaboration with Danish researchers abroad can end up being used in anything from mass surveillance systems to projects with direct military applications.

Two-step assessment

The security assessment consists of a local pre-screening and, if necessary, an extended screening.

The pre-screening is carried out at the department or centre level by a researcher of at least associate professor rank. The first step is to assess whether UCPH’s interest in the collaboration — its expected academic and strategic benefit — is significant enough to outweigh the potential risks. It is also assessed whether the project involves critical technology, dual-use research (civilian and military), or areas of strategic significance to the university. At the same time, it is investigated whether the individual has strong ties to one of the high-risk countries — for example through long-term stays, funding, or extensive co-publications.

READ ALSO: Research is global, but security is key, says minister

Extended screening is conducted by the UCPH Research and Information Security unit if the local assessment indicates both critical research and strong ties to a high-risk country. The final decision is then made by the local management. If the collaboration then goes ahead despite the extended screening advising against it, the decision must be justified in writing to the faculty dean.

No numbers on rejections

Several Danish universities have published figures on how many applicants from the three high-risk countries have been rejected due to espionage suspicions.

Aarhus University has rejected 24 researchers, while Roskilde University (RUC) has rejected four people.

READ ALSO: Danish government puts new restrictions on Chinese research co-operation

According to Kim Brinckmann, the University of Copenhagen does not keep centralised records of how many researchers from the three countries have been rejected. He says it is unlikely that the number is zero however.

»We don’t have numbers for this at the central level, but I would certainly expect that people have been rejected,« he says.

This article was first written in Danish and published on 14 August 2025. It has been translated into English and post-edited by Mike Young.